Such legends were by no means rare in Antiquity. Seleucia Pieria’s legend, however, was more elaborate than average, as Malalas reveals. That detail, far from being a mere anecdote, sums up the history and fate of Seleucia Pieria. It was to be the new capital city of a new Hellenistic dynasty ; and it became so. But its sudden, almost miraculous ascension from tiny fishing-village to Greek polis and capital city designated by Zeus, was soon followed by a slow metamorphosis. Once the key to an empire, it converted to a Greek and Roman trading post for customers a hundred days’ sailing away.

A Strategy For Empire

Seleucia Pieria was founded along with three other “sister cities” in the N-W corner of Syria :Antioch, Apamea and Laodicea. None of the four sites was an obvious candidate for an urban project. The founder, Seleukos I Nikator, a former comrade-in-arms of Alexander the Great and one of several fighting over the spoils of the latter’s empire, was not looking for a magnificent site ; he had a strategy to which current circumstances led him :

• his domain, won through battle with other satraps, bordered in the east on India, the Parthian territories and the Central Asian plateau. His original capital city of Babylon was in ruins after years of war. His base had been transferred to a new city, Seleucia-on-the-Tigris (Zeugma) ;
• in the west, his domain bordered on Syria, land disputed by Ptolemy I of Egypt who had conquered Palestine and Phoenicia, and Antigonos, lord of Asia Minor and Cyprus. In other words, Seleukos’s kingdom had no access to the Mediterranean ;
• after he destroyed Antigonia on the Orontes, and following the death of Antigonos, he could claim lordship in N-W Syria, with access to the sea ;
• Seleukos I was a Macedonian, a Hellenic general/prince raised on Greek ideals. Consequently, his kingdom seemed worthless until it was composed of Greek cities with access to the sea, as vital to a Greek as the plains to nomads.

Taking advantage of a lull in the unresolved conflict with the other Macedonian princes, Seleukos undertook the herculean task of simultaneously founding four cities in an empty space. In so doing, he made a masterful move :

• politically : he was positioning himself within the danger zone, adopting an offensive rather than defensive stance vis-à-vis his neighbours ;
• culturally : he was “civilising” his empire, i.e. reinforcing Greek culture in his territory, thus elevating his status ; for in the eyes of the Greeks, the land and culture of the Mesopotamians were as “uncivilised” as Italy and Gallia in the west ; a satrap or king of Mesopotamia could never be considered anything more than a barbarian prince. In founding new cities, Seleukos was showing himself to be a “serious player” in the game of Empire.

These aspects, taking into consideration the Macedonian mentality imbued with Alexander’s thirst for glory and heroism, and an unequivocal sense of cultural superiority, paints the picture of what Seleucia Pieria stood for in the eyes of its founder : a Greek polis, a manifestation of civilisation in the midst of a desert, a light in the darkness, with its attendant ideals of Greek liberty, harmony and intellect. And though it became in later years an important commercial asset, import and export were emphatically absent from the strategy of Seleucia Pieria’s foundation. The kingdom already had ample trade with India (vital because of the elephants used in Hellenistic armies), Arabia and the Far East. Trade with Rome did not even occur to the Macedonian king any more than it had occurred to Alexander a generation earlier.

Political Strategy and Geography

Development began with establishing a population in the city. Greek, Jewish and Syrian veterans of the king’s army, as well as inhabitants of nearby fishing villages consituted the first wave of immigrants. It was very soon followed by others, mostly made up of Macedonians and other Hellenes who sensed the beckoning of opportunity.

An incredibly vast building project got under way. The mountains surrounding Seleucia Pieria were a rich and easily accessible source of limestone and basalt, which facilitated construction. The city lay in a danger zone ; priority went to security measures. Walls went from the coast up the left flank of the mountain on the edge of strong-flowing rapids in a ravine, running east and slightly north to the summit at 870 metres, then due east before descending the right flank at odd angles to rejoin the coast not far from the mouth of the River Orontes (figure at left). Towers punctuated the wall. At the summit, a fortress sited away from the North Gate afforded advance notice of enemy approach. Within the city walls, on a small promontory a small distance down the mountain, a citadel - acropolis - looked after interior defenses.

Part of the city was built on the mountain slope – the upper city – while another part lined the coast – the lower city. The two sectors were separated by a narrow ravine into which was carved an irregular stairway (figure at right). At least one gate on the stairway added further security.

On the coast, Greek engineers designed a port. Its defense was assured by shelters hewn into the side of the cliffs that bordered on the narrow beach, affording an indestructible marine fortress. Seleukos had no fleet. Shipbuilders went to work. The cedars and pines that covered the mountainside provided ample material for building ships ; the lower city would have been an enormous naval construction site. Rope and sails were available in Tyre, but that was Egyptian territory ; the king no doubt supplied his fleet with material sent from Damascus.

Once the city was fortified and a modest fleet operational, Seleukos’s world status improved greatly. In defense : even staying close to home, his ships held two enemy fleets under surveillance. Vessels from the west belonging to Demetrios, lord of Asia Minor and Cyprus, were easily monitored, as were movements of Ptolemy’s Egyptian fleet to the south. In offense : even a small Syrian fleet affected the political status quo. Demetrios and Ptolemy were nominally at war with each other and were of more or less equal strength. Whichever side managed to make Seleukos an ally became ipso facto the stronger player. And all of them knew it. (1)

Such was the strategic importance of Seleucia Pieria in international affairs from the day it was founded and for the next 250 years. Its geographical situation in the N-E Mediterranean sector gave the Seleukid empire political strength, viability and stability. In 246 B.C.E., Ptolemy III Euergetes of Egypt took advantage of a crisis in the Seleukid succession to invade Syria. He wasted no time in occupying Antioch (if only for two years) and Seleucia Pieria for twenty-seven (until 219 B.C.E.), which weakened the realm considerably.(2) According to Polybius, it was long enough for king Antiochus III to consider abandoning the city to Egypt. The king only changed his mind when his personal physician, Apollophanes - a native of Seleucia Pieria - upbraided him. The argument that Polybius attributes to the physician plainly states our thesis, i.e. that Seleucia Pieria was vital to the kingdom because of its geographical situation (see inset).

Meanwhile, at the other end of the Mediterranean, two other powers - Carthage and Rome - were involved in their own conflict. In 215, when Philip V of Macedon allied himself with the former to make trouble for Rome, it was a signal to the Republic to meddle in Greek affairs ; from then on, things would never be the same in the eastern Mediterranean.

Rome Arrives in Syria

Two developments in particular helped push the Roman Republic into intervening all over the Hellenistic world : 1) Antiochus III received Hannibal as a friend in 195, causing Rome to fear another hostile coalition ; 2) the same then sailed to Greece in 192 to support the Aetolians in their revolt against Rome. He was defeated, but Rome had seen the Seleukid monarch make good use of his fleet and port city. It taught them a lesson.

After the destruction of Carthage in 146, a semblance of Mediterranean peace prevailed until the Syrians, once again exasperated with Seleukid rule, invited Tigranes II of Armenia to be their ruler. He governed nearly all of the Seleukid kingdom from 83 to 69 before showing positive opposition to Rome. He granted asylum to Mithridates VI, King of Pontus, another of Rome’s enemies. When he refused to deliver the refugee to the envoys of the Roman governor of Asia and Cilicia, L. Licinius Lucullus, Rome declared war. Tigranes was evinced from Syria and Phoenicia. Lucullus accepted the restoration of a Seleukid monarch, Antiochus XIII, but this prince proved himself to be a puppet in the hands of Arab chieftains, themselves on-and-off vassals of the enemy Parthians. Consequently, the region remained a hotbed of turmoil. In addition, Antiochus XIII could do nothing about the brigands and pirates that infested Cilicia and the eastern Mediterranean and who were a nuisance to Roman lines of communication. Finally, in 64, the great Pompey arrived in Seleucia Pieria, advanced to Antioch, deposed the Seleukid king and made Syria into a province.

From left to right : Mithridates VI, King of Pontus ; Pompey ; Marc Antony.

By then however, things had changed in Italy. Rome was at still war : this time with herself. The eastern Mediterranean continued to be the theatre of rival forces : Crassus, Pompey, Julius Caesar, Cassius, Marc Antony, Octavian. Only in 30 B.C.E., with the suicides of Antony and Cleopatra (who had been married in Antioch), did an era of non-aggression dawn in Syria.

The Pax Romana changed the fate of Seleucia Pieria. With Asia and Egypt pacified (i.e. annexed), and Armenia acting as a buffer state between the Roman and Parthian empires, Seleucia Pieria’s primary business ceased to be of a military nature. The port city underwent a conversion. From a fortress assuring the viability of the uncertain Seleukid realm, it became a gateway to the opulent East. For Romans had for more than a century grown avid for Hellenistic luxury. The wealthy of Rome hungered after exotic imports from Arabia, India, China. Since Roman legions no longer needed to monopolise the roads and other lines of transportation between East and West, caravans and merchant ships could travel safely by land or sea on the business of appeasing the insatiable appetites of Roman citizens. A great many items of consumption found their way from the Far East to the Euphrates, then to the Orontes, to Antioch and Seleucia Pieria, thence onto immense merchant vessels who stopped first in Alexandria to board more cargo before going on to Rome.

The city plunged heart and soul into a business so lucrative that it inspired jealousy in the hearts of many Italians. Hence Juvenal would write with not a small amount of bitterness : In Tiberim Syrius defluxit Orontes. (3)

(1) At least in theory. In fact, Seleukos allied himself with Demetrios, but the latter turned his back on the eastern Mediterranean to wage war in Macedon, leaving Cyprus wide open to attack. Demetrios’s move sealed his doom ; by tacit agreement with Ptolemy, Seleukos reneged on his alliance, allowed Ptolemy to occupy Cyprus while he captured Cilicia.

(2) In fact, Seleucia Pieria and Antioch both welcomed Ptolemy III Euergetes with open arms, so deep was popular discontent with the Seleukids. As it turned out, the Lagids were no better.

(3) « The Syrian Orontes empties into the Tiber. » Satires, III, 62.

On-line photocredits : A Seleukid coin from the reign of Antiochus IX (115-95 B.C.E.), showing the prow of a galley ; a Greek ship ; busts of Marc Antony, Mithridates VI and Pompey.
The pictures of the ruined walls along the flank of the mountain, and the stairs to upper Seleucia, are from the article of S. Ledoux in Archéologia,no. 360, 1999, Éd. Faton, Dijon.

Bibliography

G. G. Aperghis, The Seleukid Royal Economy, Cambridge (UK), 2004.
Victor Chapot, “Séleucie-de-Piérie,” in Mémoires de la Société Nationale des Antiquaires de France, vol. VI, Paris, 1908, pp. 148-226.
Glanville Downey, Ancient Antioch, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1963.
Sylveline Ledoux, “Séleucie-de-Piérie,” in Archéologia,no. 360, 1999, Éd. Faton, Dijon, pp. 58-66.
Polybius, Histories, Book V. Translation by Evelyn S. Shuckburgh, In Parenthesis Publications, Cambridge (Ontario), 2002.
J.-P. Rey-Coquais, “Syrie Romaine, de Pompée à Dioclétien,” in JRS, 68, 1978, pp. 44-55.