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The Rise of Philip of Macedon

The Rise of Philip of Macedon

The rise of the kingdom of Macedon to power in the fourth century B.C. can rightly be said to be the accomplishment of one man, the son of Amyntas III, Philip II. Macedon before Philip was a country threatened both externally and internally. Externally, the Greek states, especially those who exercised hegemony in the Aegean threatened, as well as the Chalcidians and the Illyrians, among others. Internally, the threat of pretenders to the throne was ever present. Macedon on the eve of Philip’s accession had been in turmoil and there was little reason to doubt that the situation would change. But never before had there been a ruler of Macedon like Philip. Over the twenty-three years of his reign, Philip would use both diplomacy and military force to achieve his goals, and deceit would help him to buy the time he needed in order to effectively deploy his diplomatic and military strategies. When dealing with the mainland Greek states, Philip preferred to use diplomatic means to bring alliance and peace between Macedon and her opponents. Closer to home, in Thrace and Thessaly, Philip would use both military force and diplomacy and against the Illyrian and Paeonian who tried marauding into Macedon, Philip resorted to military force. It is apparent that Philip preferred diplomatic solutions to military ones for he seemed to attempt diplomatic resolutions first.

When Philip II acceded to the throne of Macedon in 359 B.C. Macedon looked on the verge of collapse. There were four main and immediate threats to Philip’s rule in Macedon. To the northwest, ready to invade were the Illyrians of Bardylis, from the north the Paeonians threatened assault, to the east the Thracian king Berisades supported the pretender Pausanias, and from the sea there was the threat of the Athenians who sought to restore Argaeus to the throne. Philip was lucky, the Illyrians failed to act promptly granting him the one thing he needed most, time. Philip used the time wisely in dealing with the threats to Macedonian independence.

Philip’s diplomatic successes at this point in his career are obvious. Diodorus Siculus described how Philip dealt with the Paeonians in order to maintain the peace: “he sent an embassy to the Paeonians, and by corrupting some with gifts and persuading others by generous promises he made an agreement with them to maintain peace for the present.” Similar delaying tactics were used with Berisades in Thrace. Philip’s diplomatic skills were also employed in dealing with the threat from Athens. The Athenians had long coveted the city of Amphipolis and for this reason, Diodorus explained, they were supporting Argaeus’ bid for the throne. Philip realized this and in an effort to minimize the Athenian menace decided to withdraw his garrison from Amphipolis after letting Athens know that he renounced his claim to the city. Philip’s efforts bore immediate fruit, evidently, for the Athenian general Mantias did not advance into Macedon with Argaeus but stayed at Methone with the Athenians troops. In order to further his plans, Philip sent ambassadors to Athens to make peace between Macedon and Athens on the grounds that he had abandoned Amphipolis. He succeeded. Philip was thus able to deal diplomatically with three of the threats that faced him immediately upon his accession to the throne. Philip’s dealings with Athens at this point illustrate his willingness to use deceit to achieve his goals. Without doubt, Philip did not intend to leave Amphipolis in the hands of Athens. In fact, the next year, 358 B.C. or at the latest in 357, Philip besieged and took Amphipolis. His earlier demonstration notwithstanding, Philip probably had no intention of giving up his claim on Amphipolis. He had bought time by letting Athens believe he had abandoned his claims on Amphipolis.

Of course, Argaeus remained a threat. Philip now used military force to contain Argaeus. Without the support of Athens, Argaeus moved toward Aegae with only his mercenary force. Being rebuffed at Aegae, Argaeus attempted to return to Methone, but was intercepted by Philip. Philip defeated Argaeus and his mercenaries ending the threat from that quarter. Philip treated the Athenians present with kindness, allowing them to return to Athens without ransoming them. Philip undoubtedly hoped this would prove his good intentions towards Athens and was another instance of his diplomacy. During the winter that followed, Philip trained his men and prepared them for action. He put this to good use the following year when he marched his Macedonians into Paeonia and won a decisive victory, subjugating that people to Macedonian rule. Philip wasted no time and followed up this victory by marching against Bardylis and the Illyrians. Battle was joined and the Macedonians proved the stronger. The Illyrians withdrew from all the cities of Macedonia they had been occupying and obtained a peace from Philip. The result of this battle was the uniting of Upper Macedonia with Lower Macedonia. Philip in one victory doubled the territory, population and wealth of his kingdom.

Philip wasn’t finished with the stabilizing of his borders. Once he was secure in his kingdom, Philip began to look at what his possible options for further action might be. One of his first aggressive moves was to besiege Amphipolis. Diodorus stated that the people of Amphipolis were ill disposed toward Philip and presented many excuses for war. Unfortunately, he did not state what those pretexts were. Perhaps the Amphipolitans had refused to readmit a Macedonian garrison that Philip had withdrawn two years earlier. Regardless, Amphipolis was placed under siege by Philip and through the use of siege engines and battering rams, he was able to breach the walls and take the city. Demosthenes related that two Amphipolitans, Hierax and Stratokles came before the Assembly at Athens and encouraged the Athenians to sail to their city and take it over. Demosthenes recorded that no help was sent at this time. It is likely that no help was sent to Amphipolis at this time because the Social War had just broken out between Athens and the members of her second confederacy. It is also quite likely that Philip, who showed no desire to engage Athens when she was in her strength, took the opportunity of the Social War to deal with issues in Macedon and the immediate areas that would normally have brought the Athenians quickly against him. Quick to prevent Athens from intervening, just in case, Philip may have sent a note to Athens informing them that upon his capture of Amphipolis, he intended to turn it over to Athens. This is another case of deceit by Philip who probably never intended to turn Amphipolis over.

Whatever the case, Amphipolis fell, and the Athenians were quite unhappy about things. The Olynthians, too, were concerned and offered alliance to Athens against Philip. Perhaps it was the Philip’s note to Athens that prompted the Athenians to reject the Olynthian offer in hopes that they could still deal with Philip. The fall of Pydna to Philip must have ended these hopes and they declared war. Philip, knowing that peace with Athens was over, set about to ensure that Athens and the Chalcidian League made no alliance. There was only one area of Athenian influence left, and Philip was prepared to offer the Chalcidians Potidaea in return for an alliance. The League accepted Philip’s offer. Philip had through this act of diplomacy secured himself against the one threat that could have caused him significant concern, an Olynthian/Athenian alliance. In addition, by capturing Potidaea and turning it over to his new allies, he had rid himself of every Athenian base in or near his territory.

In his first three years on the throne, Philip showed an amazing ability to use both military force and diplomacy to achieve his goals. Militarily, he had reduced the Illyrians, Paeonians and several cities such as Amphipolis and Potidaea by the strength of his newly reformed army. Diplomatically, Philip had shown that he was quite capable also. He had not only forestalled attacks by the Thracians and Athenians, he had actually achieved a treaty of peace with Athens that lasted until Philip himself violated it by taking Amphipolis. Understanding the possible precariousness of his situation, Philip wasted no time in driving a wedge between the Olynthians and the Athenians by offering the Olynthians the city of Potidaea. His efforts to keep the Athenians immobile through deceit also seem to be effective as Demosthenes alluded to in the first of his Olynthiacs.

But Philip’s career was far from over, and he achieved a great deal more. Philip at some point after these first years of buttressing his rule in Macedon began to look towards Asia as a possible outlet for the energies of his army. Undoubtedly, attacking the Persians offered numerous opportunities to enrich Macedon and bring glory to his own name. This desire probably began to take hold on Philip sometime shortly after the defeat of the rebellious satrap Artabazos who found refuge at Philip’s court in Pella. This possibility may have been behind Philip’s seeming desire to bring peace to mainland Greece so that he might in turn transfer his attention to Asia Minor. Philip thus seems quite interested in putting an end to the Sacred War and in 346 does so, not through a military victory, but through a diplomatic solution, the “Convention between Philip and the Phocians” by which the Phocian leaders surrendered their fortresses and departed Phocis and Boeotia.

Prior to the Convention between Philip and the Phocians, Philip had finally been able to obtain a treaty of peace with the Athenians again. The achievement had been a tricky one, for Philip needed to finish his subjugation of areas in Thrace and his defeat of Cersebleptes, an Athenian ally, before he was willing to sign the peace with Athens. The peace treaty with Athens was necessary in order for Philip to end the Sacred War (see above) to which he was committed. Athens had impeded Philip once in this regard, and he certainly didn’t want her to do so again. Despite Athenian attempts at a Panhellenic alliance in order to continue the war against Philip, Philip continued to press for peace with Athens. He showed a great deal of forbearance with Athens during this period, for he certainly could have pressed the attack against Athens had he been so inclined. It was in 346 that Athens sent ten ambassadors to Philip to discuss with him a peace and matters of common interest. He met them at Pella, and devoted a great deal of time to the discussions with them. Aeschines, in On the Embassy, noted that Philip was charming and a very eloquent speaker and that he had replied to each of the speakers in turn. Hammond argues that Philip used this opportunity to meet the Athenians on their own grounds of technical oratory. In addition, this long and basically valueless activity would have engendered good relations with the ambassadors. It was these ambassadors that Philip hoped would carry his message of peace back to the Athenians and convince them of his sincerity and the need to forget about Amphipolis and everything else. Philip obtained his peace treaty with Athens, and his alliance. Philip would continue to establish numbers of diplomatic relations throughout Greece in order to secure the mainland and keep it peaceful. That he was unsuccessful and eventually forced to battle for military control of Greece at Chaeronea in 338 is due less to his abilities as a diplomat and more to the general Greek attitudes about independence.

Philip, from his first actions as the monarch of Macedon down to his death in 336, used a mixture of diplomacy and military force to achieve his ends, with an emphasis on using diplomacy when he could. He seems most willing to use his military against non-Greek forces, particularly in Thrace and against the northern tribes of Illyria and Paeonia, though he also used diplomacy in such cases when it suited him. In dealing with the Greeks, Philip seemed more inclined to seek diplomatic solutions and agreements. His nearly continuous forbearance and benevolence towards Athens speaks of his desire for a peaceful solution to their disagreements. His problems with the Chalcidian League likewise stem from their unwillingness to compromise with Philip. In both cases, Philip’s only means of ensuring peace was to go to war with these powers, but he seems to have exhausted all other options before making that decision. Of course, it was the threat of his military power that allowed him some of his diplomatic successes, but this is not unexpected. Philip did use deceit in order to achieve his ends. He used it mainly as a delaying tactic while he implemented his other plans, either diplomatic or militaristic. Deceit should not be considered one of his main tools, but rather an extension of either his military or diplomatic strategies. Diodorus too believed that Philip relied more on his diplomacy than on his sword, “the growth of his position was not due so much to his prowess in arms as to his adroitness and cordiality in diplomacy.”

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